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The Financial Crisis
from a Forecaster’s Perspective
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany, which is very diﬀerent
from previous recessions, in particular regarding its cause and magnitude. We show
to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect
the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast
errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted
during this recession which implies that the recession was very diﬃcult to forecast.
However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have
indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models.
Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared
to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual
models. A comparison of expert forecasts with the best forecasts based on leading
indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement
of expert forecasts during the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is relatively small.
Keywords: leading indicators, recession, consensus forecast, non-linearities
JEL classiﬁcation: E37, C53
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The Financial Crisis
from a Forecaster’s Perspective
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Rezession der Jahre 2008/2009 in Deutschland.
Diese Rezession hebt sich in ihrer Ursache und Schwere deutlich von früheren
Rezessionen ab. Es wird gezeigt, inwieweit Prognostiker und Prognosen basierend
auf Frühindikatoren den Zeitpunkt und die Stärke dieser Rezession verfehlt haben.
Diese Studie deutet darauf hin, dass aufgrund der großen Prognosefehler bei
Expertenprognosen und bei Prognosen basierend auf Frühindikatoren die Rezession
sehr schwer zu prognostizieren war. Allerdings gibt es einige Frühindikatoren
(Umfragedaten, Risikoaufschläge, Aktienpreise), die eine Wachstumsabschwächung
prognostiziert haben und damit deutlich besser abschneiden als univariate Zeitrei-
henmodelle. Jedoch konnte insbesondere die Stärke nicht richtig eingeschätzt werden.
Die Kombination einzelner Prognosemodelle bietet zwar eine Verbesserung zur
Benchmarkprognose, schneidet aber schlechter ab als einige Einzelindikatormodelle.
Vergleicht man die Expertenprognosen mit den besten Prognosen auf Basis von
Frühindikatoren so ist der Abstand relativ klein. Insgesamt ist der Spielraum einer
Verbesserung der Expertenprognose in der Krise im Vergleich zu Indikatormodellen
relativ gering.
Schlagwörter: Frühindikatoren, Rezession, Consensus Prognose, Nichtlinearitäten
JEL-Klassiﬁkation: E37, C53
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1 Motivation
The ﬁnancial crisis 2008/2009 and the followed recession in Germany are very distinct
from past recessions. It turned out as the most severe recession since the Second
World War. Production declined by about 7% within one year measured by GDP.
Industrial production was hit even stronger and shrunk by 20% during the same
period. The origins of this slump can be found in the US ﬁnancial and banking sector
in 2007. The following credit crunch drags along basically all industrialized countries.
Germany, that can be characterized by an export oriented industry, has been heavily
aﬀected by the shrinking demand and thus saw one of the most pronounced drop in
production among all developed countries.
Despite of the exceptional magnitude of the recession, many professional forecasters
did not foresee the current recession. Thus professionals have been highly criticized
for not anticipating the huge downturn neither in time nor in extent for a long
time (see e.g. Koll et al., 2009 for a discussion). Because many professionals use
leading indicators to assess the current and future situation of the economy, we ask
how leading indicator forecasts perform during this exceptionally heavy recession.
Therefore, we analyze how econometric models that use leading indicator information
have performed during the crisis.
The literature on the performance of leading indicators for Germany is large (see
Kholodilin/Siliverstovs, 2006 and the references therein). However, none of the
authors draw special attention on the forecasting properties of leading indicators
during a pronounced recession. In contrast, there is also some literature on forecasting
recessions with non-linear models such as probit models (see Fritsche/Kuzin, 2005)
that concentrates on the probability of turning into a recession. However, this
approach does not provide a quantitative forecast of output growth which is more
informative.
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to document how professional forecasters did
during the ﬁnancial crisis. We document that no one has anticipated the recession
early and furthermore, all underestimated the impact on production. Motivated
by the work of Stock/Watson (2003a) who analyzed the performance of leading
indicators during the 2001 recession in the US, we further ask whether leading
indicators provide useful information before and during the crisis. We analyze
whether leading indicators can predict the slowdown in production earlier in time
and, hence, can be conducive to an adequate policy making.
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We investigate a set of prominent leading indicators for Germany in the emergence of
the recession, consisting of survey based measures, ﬁnancial market indicators, real
activity variables and composite leading indicators. We analyze the performance of
each indicator in forecasting both (i) GDP and (ii) industrial production (IP) from
1 to 4 quarters ahead. Since the origin of the recession is viewed in the ﬁnancial
sector, we particularly analyze ﬁnancial indicators as predictors for real activity (for a
literature review see Stock/Watson, 2003b). One central contribution we make is that
we consider not only linear models for output growth, but also non-linear models that
take into account a threshold eﬀect (threshold leading indicator models). Further, we
augment our analysis to forecast combinations. Since in practice individual indicators
are not used in isolation, forecast combination schemes provide an eﬃcient way to
summarize the results given by many diﬀerent models. Finally, we compare leading
indicator forecasts (single and pooled) with forecasts from professional forecasters. To
evaluate the resulting forecasts we apply a non-parametric test based on signed-ranks
(with a modiﬁcation also suited for autocorrelated errors) that can deal with the
small out-of-sample forecast period in our case.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section describes brieﬂy the recession
2008/2009 for Germany and investigates the professional forecasts during the crisis
episode. Section 3 provides an overview of the leading indicators we use for our
forecast analysis and the model set up for the forecast experiment. Results based on
linear and non-linear models are discussed as well. Section 4 presents the performance
of the pooled forecasts. Section 5 compares leading indicator forecasts with those of
professional forecasters. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The 2008/2009 Recession and Evidence from
the Consensus Economics Forecasters
Figure 1 shows GDP and industrial production for the German economy during
the crisis period. Both series peaked in the ﬁrst quarter 2008, then output declined
over four consecutive quarters. With the most sizable downturn in output since
decades, GDP and IP saw the biggest slump during the two winter quarters. In
the second quarter 2009, GDP shows some recovery and again a positive quarterly
growth rate. At the same time IP dropped further slightly, but also shows signs of
a recovery since May 2009. Despite some positive signs after the ﬁrst quarter in
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2009 the average growth rate of GDP is strongly negative and in the range of -5%.
Since the manufacturing sector is much more aﬀected by this slowdown than any
other sector, IP was expected to fall more severe — on average recent forecasts were
around -17% for 2009.

























































Source: Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.3, release November 2010, German Statistical Oﬃce.
During the year 2010 the German economy has further recovered. Although there is
no oﬃcial business cycle committee in Germany, but when one deﬁnes a recession
from peak to trough of production, the recession would be judged from 2008q1 to
2009q1. However, in this paper we take a broader view and consider some additional
quarters before and after this narrow deﬁnition as our period of interest; namely we
analyses the period between 2007q1 and 2009q4.
Each month, Consensus Economics surveys a large panel of ﬁnancial and economic
experts about their estimates on important macroeconomic variables such as growth,
inﬂation and interest rates. This survey is known as Consensus Forecast. For
Germany, about 30 institutions participate in this poll - mainly banks and economic
research institutes. The monthly poll asks for the forecast of these macroeconomic
variables for the current and following year.
Figure 2 shows the mean point forecast for the growth rates of GDP and IP for
2009. In January 2008, the mean GDP forecast for 2009 was slightly below 2%.
This indicates that professional forecasts did not take into account ﬁrst hints of the
upcoming ﬁnancial crisis for their yearly growth projection. Until summer 2008,
mean GDP forecast was only revised down slightly to 1%. The conventional view
was that the world economy is just in a small temporary weakness which has also
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Note: Annual GDP and industrial production Consensus Forecasts (average) for 2009 for Germany
are shown.
Source: Consensus Economics (2009).
eﬀects on the German economy. Things changed dramatically when Lehman went
bankrupt end of September 2008. In November 2008, the mean GDP forecast turned
negative and was further revised to -6% in summer 2009. A similar pattern is also
found for IP, where in November 2008 the mean forecast was below zero and was
then gradually revised down to about -17%.
This picture is supported by looking at year-on-year forecasts for each quarter. Table
1 shows for each survey date (in rows) all quarterly forecasts made up to the end of
2009. While in 2008q1 all forecasts were relatively homogeneous between 1.3% and
1.9%, in the second quarter a weakness was expected for the ﬁrst two quarters 2009.
In 2008q3, a few weeks before the Lehman breakdown, panelists reported a negative
year-on-year growth rate for 2009q1, but afterwards a relative fast recovery. In the
next subsequent quarter, the economic outlook worsened dramatically and a negative
growth rate was reported for all upcoming quarters. However, for 2008q4 and the
ﬁrst half of 2009, the ﬁrst numbers released clearly exceed the so far predicted ﬁgures.
For instance, in 2008q4 the consensus forecasters expected a GDP growth of -1.9%
for the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, which turns out to be -6.7% based on the ﬁnal release
of the German Statistical Oﬃce.
Analyzing the recession probability by the fraction of panelists who report a negative
growth rate of GDP or IP for the year 2009, we ﬁnd that while none of the participating
institutions has expected a negative growth rate for 2009 until September 2008, this
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Table 1: Quarterly GDP Forecasts
Forecast horizon
2007 2008 2009











2007 Q1 3.0 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0
Q2 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1
Q3 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.1
Q4 2.5 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8
2008 Q1 1.8 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.9
Q2 2.6 2.2 1.7 1.7 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.8
Q3 2.6 1.7 1.2 0.9 -0.1 0.7 1.0 1.3
Q4 2.7 1.9 0.8 -0.2 -1.9 -1.8 -1.2 -0.3
2009 Q1 0.8 -1.7 -4.1 -3.6 -3.0 -1.0
Q2 0.8 -1.8 -6.9 -6.6 -6.0 -3.7
Q3 -6.7 -5.9 -4.9 -2.1
Q4 -6.7 -5.8 -4.8 -2.0
Note: Quarterly expected and realized year-on-year percentage growth rates of real GDP are shown.
The oﬃcial release is in bold. Figures are working-day adjusted.
Source: Consensus Economics (2009), German Statistical Oﬃce (2007-2009).
fraction increases rapidly until December 2008, where all participating institutions
expect a recession in 2009. Looking at industrial production, some participants
anticipated the recession earlier this year.1
Taken together, the professional forecasts indicate several facts: First, before the
Lehman breakdown nobody expected a sharp slowdown. If anything, then a tempo-
rary weakness for the second half of 2008 or in the beginning of 2009 was anticipated.
Second, after Lehman, forecasters revised down their forecasts quickly but still un-
derestimated the severity of the recession. More recently we have seen some tendency
that forecasters have started to revise up their growth ﬁgures. However, the aim of
our study is not the analysis of the performance of Consensus Forecasts per se (see
Ager/Kappler/Osterloh, 2009), but to show how they perform compared to selected
leading indicators during this recession.
1 Interestingly, it is Lehman Brothers that already forecast negative growth for industrial production
for 2009 in June 2008.
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Note: Fraction of forecasters that predict a negative rate for annual GDP and industrial production
growth for 2009 for Germany. The calculation takes into account the diﬀerent number of the
institutions participating at the Consensus Forecast.
Source: Consensus Economics (2009), own calculation.
3 Forecasts based on individual Leading
Indicators
It is well known that many institutions commonly use leading indicators in judging the
current and future situation of the economy. Thus, we also employ these indicators
to produce forecasts for real economic activity. This procedure quasi mimics the
process of forecasting of the professional forecasters. In what follows, we investigate
a huge set of indicators and analyze which indicator has signaled the slowdown in
production and which has not. Therefore, we use speciﬁcations within the class of
linear as well as non-linear models.
3.1 Linear Models of Output Growth
For constructing leading indicator forecasts we follow standard practice (see e.g.
Stock/Watson, 2003b) and estimate dynamic models where each model includes one
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single indicator (with potential lagged values). More speciﬁcally, we regress one to
four quarters of seasonally adjusted output growth on its past growth rates and on
lags of a candidate indicator (e.g. interest rates) over the period 1992q1-2006q4-h+1.
Let Yt = ∆lnQt where Qt is the level of output (either the level of real GDP or
the index of IP) and let Xt be a candidate predictor.2 As indicated by standard
ADF unit root tests, the indicator variables can be all characterised by stationary
behavior (see Table 6 in the Appendix). Y h
t+h is the output growth over the next h
periods (quarters) in terms of an annualized rate.3
Forecasts are based on a h-step ahead regression model:
Y
h










t+h is an error term and α, β and γ are the regression coeﬃcients to be
estimated. Diﬀerent from other studies we take into account the timely availability
of the indicators (reﬂected in k). Depending on the publication lag of the candidate
predictor, k varies from 0 to 1 for quarterly data.4 The optimal number lags in the
quarterly analysis is restricted to 1 ≤ p ≤ 4 and 0 ≤ q ≤ 4 and are selected by the
Schwarz criterion (SIC).
For the quasi real-time out-of-sample forecasting experiment we estimate eq.(1)
only using data prior to the forecasting date by applying a recursive scheme.5 The
recursive estimation scheme implies that for each forecasting round we include one
additional observation. One to four step ahead forecasts are made for the period
2007q1 to 2009q4.
2 We take the data set as it was available in January 2011. All subsequent analysis is based on
this publication date including the forecast evaluation step. We construct a quarterly IP series
by taking monthly averages.
3 Y h
t = (400/h)ln(Qt/Qt−h) for real GDP and industrial production, respectively.
4 In order to guarantee comparability to the consensus forecast we consider all information for the
ongoing quarter until the beginning of the respective third month.
5 However, the simulated real-time forecast scheme does not consider revisions of the data. This
problem is of minor importance for the indicator variable, since ﬁnancial market indicators or
survey measures are hardly revised. For the dependent variables GDP and IP this can be an issue.
In particular IP revisions can be substantial and therefore the performance can appear better
than it might be in real time. For Germany, Benner/Meier (2005) as well as Schumacher/Breitung
(2008) compare the performance of leading indicators with both real-time data and ﬁnal revised
data in a similar setting than we do. Both studies conclude that the relative performance of
indicators remains stable (also the absolute precision is somewhat lower with real-time data).
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3.2 Non-linear Models of Output Growth
We also augment our analysis to include non-linear models which is novel in the
context of leading indicator models on output growth for Germany. International
evidence suggests that for some indicators it is more realistic to assume a non-linear
relationship (see e.g. Galbraith/Tkacz, 2000). This seems to be evident particularly
for interest rate spreads. Therefore, we follow Clements/Galvao (2006) and consider
threshold models as originally proposed by Tong (1983). The resulting threshold




























where I(.) is an indicator function equal to 1 when zi,t−d ≤ r, and equal to zero
otherwise. d is the time delay and r the threshold value. Estimates for d, r, α1,
β11,...,γ11,...,α2, β21,...,γ21,...,γ2q are obtained by conditional least squares. This
implies that conditional on the estimates of r and d, the remaining parameters are
estimated by least squares. The parameters of r and d are deﬁned as the values that
minimize the sum of squared residuals over a grid of possible values.6 For the sake
of simplicity we take the same number of lags for the leading indicator and output
growth which are choosen by SIC of the linear model.
3.3 Data Set
In this paper we consider several leading indicators that have been suggested in the
literature.7 The most prominent indicators used are survey based measures such
as the ifo business cycle climate index or the ZEW sentiment indicator. Another
important group of leading indicators considered in this paper consists of ﬁnancial
market indicators. Since the origins of the analyzed recession emerged from the
6 The limits of the grid for the delay d are 1 (lower) and 2 (upper).The limits for the threshold r
are such that each regime has at least 30% of the observations.
7 There is a large literature on leading indicators for Germany, both for GDP and IP (see among
others Döpke/Krämer/Langfeldt, 1995; Breitung/Jagodzinski, 2001; Fritsche/Stephan, 2002;
Kholodilin/Silverstovs, 2006 or Drechsel/Scheufele, 2010). A more detailed description of the
leading indicators can be also found in these references.
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ﬁnancial sector, we might expect some early warning signals particular from these
indicators.8 The advantage of both ﬁnancial market indicators and survey measures
is their early availability and their mostly forward-looking characteristic. In addition,
these indicators are not revised.
Our dataset comprises 42 leading indicators from diﬀerent categories: surveys,
ﬁnancial variables and real activity measures (new orders, labor market indicators
and prices).9 Seasonally adjusted series are used whenever available. All variables
are made stationary if necessary (Table 6 in the Appendix includes the results
of the standard ADF unit root test). Hence, all indicator variables considered in
the analysis can be well described as stationary processes. Additionally, we apply
stability tests for every linear indicator model. Since Kholodilin/Silverstovs (2006)
document some instabilities in the forecasting performance of leading indicators
and identify a break in 2001, we therefore calculated the F test for stability of the
parameters against the alternative of a single break at unknown date. The supremum
test (or Quandt-Andrews-Test) is used for this purpose (Andrews, 1993). The test
employed for the ﬁrst in-sample period (1992q1 - 2006q4) indicates that only for
a small fraction of leading indicator models, i.e. less than 10% at the 5% level of
signiﬁcance, the stability tests reject the null which implies that instabilities are of
minor importance for the sample under consideration (see Table 7 in the Appendix).
3.4 Forecast Evaluation
To assess the forecasting performance in detail, we investigate the forecast errors of
the diﬀerent models. More precisely, the relative root mean squared forecast error
(RMSFE) of a candidate forecast i is compared with the univariate benchmark model.
Let ˆ Y h
i,t+h|t be the forecast of the realization Y h
t+h, computed using data up to time t,
based on the ith indicator. ˆ Y h
0,t+h|t is the corresponding benchmark autoregressive















t − b Y h
0,t|t−h
2, (3)
8 Financial indicators as leading indicators for Germany have been discussed and analyzed by
Ragnitz (1994), Kirchgaessner/Savioz (2001), Sauer/Scheide (1995), Fritsche/Kuzin (2005) and
Burgstaller (2009).
9 See Appendix Table 5 for an overview.
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where T1 + h and T2 are respectively the ﬁrst and the last date for the forecasting
exercise. Over the period 2006q4+h to 2009q4 the forecast models are evaluated. A
value of the relative RMSFE less than one indicates that the candidate model has a
smaller root mean square forecast error than the benchmark model.
Table 2: Forecast results for GDP and IP during the crisis - Linear models
RMSFE
GDP IP
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Root Mean Squared Forecast Error Root Mean Squared Forecast Error
AR 6.08 5.16 4.82 4.56 19.14 16.61 14.07 13.15
RMSFE Rel. to AR Model RMSFE Rel. to AR Model
Interest Rates
IS-3M 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.98 1.01 0.99
DIL-10 0.90 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.87 ∗∗ 0.95 1.00 0.99
Interest Rates Spreads
SPR-10Y-3M 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.95 0.91
SPR-C-G 0.80 0.87 0.84 0.77 0.98 0.91 1.02 0.97
SPR-B-G 0.88 0.96 0.92 0.75 0.89 ∗∗ 0.99 ∗ 0.93 0.83
SPR-BF-G 1.35 2.01 2.65 1.21 1.51 2.03 2.34 0.94
Monetary Aggregates
DLNM1 1.00 0.92 0.92 1.01 1.00 0.90 0.94 0.89
DLNM1R 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.89 1.01 0.90 0.95 0.91
DLNM2 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DLNM2R 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DLNM3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DLNM3R 1.00 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00
Other Financial Indicators
DLNDAX 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.89 0.89 ∗ 0.85 ∗ 0.90 0.89
VOLA1 0.98 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.95 ∗ 1.00 1.01
DLNEX 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.07 1.02
DLNEXR 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.08 1.05 1.01
DLNHWWI 0.99 1.04 1.03 1.06 0.77 0.87 0.99 0.98
DLNHWWIEX 0.87 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.82 0.90 0.97 0.96
DLNOIL 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.00 0.89 0.94 1.00 1.00
Survey Indicators
IFO-C 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.85 0.75 ∗∗ 0.70 0.77 0.81
IFO-EXP 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.83 0.67 ∗∗∗ 0.70 ∗ 0.75 0.81
IFOM-C 0.72 0.76 0.81 0.86 0.66 ∗∗∗ 0.70 ∗ 0.78 0.82
IFOM-EXP 0.73 ∗ 0.75 ∗ 0.80 1.00 0.71 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗ 0.77 0.82
IFO-WC 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.89 0.82 ∗ 0.81 ∗ 0.79 0.83
IFO-WEXP 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.89 0.94 0.99
ZEW-EXP 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.86 0.98 0.96
ESI 0.69 0.79 0.83 0.88 0.74 ∗ 0.75 ∗ 0.85 0.86
ESI-INDU 0.68 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.62 ∗∗ 0.73 ∗ 0.84 0.86
ECCS99 0.78 0.88 0.95 0.97 0.87 0.81 ∗ 0.91 0.94
PMI 0.66 0.87 0.95 1.00 0.66 ∗∗ 0.75 0.89 0.93
To be continued...
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RMSFE
GDP IP
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Root Mean Squared Forecast Error Root Mean Squared Forecast Error
AR 6.08 5.16 4.82 4.56 19.14 16.61 14.07 13.15
RMSFE Rel. to AR Model RMSFE Rel. to AR Model
COM 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.94 1.04 0.82 0.97 0.94
Real Economic Indicators
DLNIP-VORL 0.99 1.05 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.98 1.03 0.99
DLNORD 0.75 1.03 0.98 0.88 0.71 ∗ 0.87 0.89 0.84
DLNORD-C 1.00 1.06 1.07 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.00
DLNORD-I 0.74 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.81 1.00 0.93 0.88
CAPA 0.77 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.89 0.93 0.91
DLNEW 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.05
DALQ 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.05 1.05
DLNVAC 0.91 0.98 0.97 0.95 1.02 1.06 1.00 0.97
DLNWHOUR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DLNCPI 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.98
DLNCPI-EX 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.04 1.02
Note: The entry in the ﬁrst line is the RMSFE for the AR model forecast, in percentage
growth rates at an annual rate. The remaining entries are the relative RMSFE of the forecast
based on the individual indicator, relative to the RMSFE of the benchmark AR forecast. The
forecast period is 2007q1 to 2009q4. The abbreviation of leading indicators are outlined in
Table 5. ∗∗∗: 1%, ∗∗: 5% and ∗: 10% indicating the signiﬁcance level of the modiﬁed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for h = 1 and h = 2 as proposed by Diebold/Mariano (1995).
However, a value smaller than one could simply occur due to sampling variability.
Furthermore, the RMSFE does not indicate whether this result is statistically
signiﬁcant. For this purpose, we apply the test for equal predictability (against the
alternative that the candidate model has smaller forecast errors). Under squared
loss we can deﬁne the loss diﬀerential as di0 = (ei)
2 − (e0)
2 where ei are the forecast
errors of indicator model i and the benchmark model 0, respectively. Generally,
when models are nested standard tests are inappropriate since they do not take
into account estimation uncertainty of the parameters (see West, 1996). In our
setting, the proportion of the sample for the out-of-sample experiment relative to the
estimation sample is very small, so we can ignore the eﬀect of parameter estimation
uncertainty (see West, 2006).
In order to handle the extreme small sample with only 12 − h observations, we
make use of a non-parametric rank test: the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. This test is
an exact test even in ﬁnite samples and does not require the normality condition.
Diebold/Mariano (1995) document the favorable properties of this approach for
testing the null of equal accuracy of two competing forecasts. However, the original
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test is only valid under the restrictive iid assumption. Since we also analyze multi-
step ahead forecasts (when h > 1), where the forecast errors follow an MA(h − 1)
process per construction, we take into account the resulting autocorrelation pattern.
Diebold/Mariano (1995) suggest than to split the sample into h parts in order to have
h subsamples where the individual observations are independent of each other. Under
the assumption that the loss diﬀerential is h − 1-dependent, each of the following
h sets of loss diﬀerentials will be free of serial correlation: {di0,1,di0,1+h,di0,1+2h,...},
{di0,2,di0,2+h,di0,2+2h,...},..., {di0,h,di0,2h,...}. A test with size bounded by α can be
obtained by performing h tests, each of size α/h on each of the h loss-diﬀerential
sequences and rejecting the null hypothesis if the null is rejected for any of the h
samples.10
3.5 Results
Tables 2 and 3 reveal the evaluation of the individual leading indicator forecasts both
for GDP as well as for industrial production one to four quarters ahead. Obviously,
the average forecast errors are extremely large in absolute size. For GDP (and IP)
the RMSFEs of the benchmark models range between 6.08 (19.14) and 4.56 (13.15)
depending on the forecasting horizon. This is a result of the exceptional recession
in 2008/2009 and the fact that forecast errors are largest at turning points (see e.g.
Zarnowitz, 1992, Section 13).
Using leading indicator models may result in a considerable gain in average fore-
casting performance as one might have expected (see Table 2). For the best linear
models the RMSFE for both GDP and IP is about 35-40% lower as compared to the
benchmark and in some cases the forecast errors are signiﬁcantly smaller compared to
the univariate model. This diﬀerence is huge since after the year 2000 it has been pre-
viously found that the forecasting performance of leading indicators for Germany has
deteriorated remarkably and that they oﬀer not much gain against a univariate bench-
mark model (see e.g. Kholodilin/Silverstovs, 2006; Kuzin/Marcellino/Schumacher,
2009 and Drechsel/Scheufele, 2010).
Generally, we ﬁnd that survey based forecasts dominate in forecast accuracy. For
GDP, Purchasing Managers’ Index for manufacturing, the conﬁdence indicators
10 Due to the small number of observations we can perform the rank test only for h = 1 and h = 2.
We apply the one-sided test in order to investigate whether the forecast errors from leading
indicator model i are smaller than the ones from the univariate benchmark model. The critical
values for the Wilcoxon test in small samples are tabulated (see e.g. Büning/Trenkler, 1994,
Table H).
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provided by the European Commission and the ifo indicators provide the smallest
forecasting errors (although only for the ifo expectations in the manufacturing
sector oﬀers signiﬁcant improvements). Also ﬁnancial indicators, in particular risk
spreads and the DAX provide relatively good forecasting performance. For industrial
production at the short horizon the general performance of leading indicator models
is even slightly better and some more forecasts turn out to be signiﬁcantly better as
the benchmark. Monetary aggregates do not turn out to be helpful in this recession.
Only narrow money (nominal and real M1) reports forecast errors slightly smaller
than the benchmark; however they are not signiﬁcant.
When we turn to non-linear models (see Table 3), we ﬁnd that some of the indicators
further improved in terms of forecast accuracy. In particular for ﬁnancial variables
a threshold eﬀect seems to be evident (which is in line with the literature, see e.g.
Clements/Galvao, 2006). We ﬁnd improvements for the term spread, stock prices
and stock price volatilities by considering non-linearities. For survey indicators the
gains from using non-linear models are less evident; only for expectation measures
some improvements can be observed. For other indicators (e.g. prices of commodities
and goods) the eﬀect of employing non-linearities is ambiguous.
Table 3: Forecast results for GDP and IP during the crisis - Non-linear models
RMSFE
GDP IP
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Root Mean Squared Forecast Error Root Mean Squared Forecast Error
AR 6.08 5.16 4.82 4.56 19.14 16.61 14.07 13.15
RMSFE Rel. to AR Model RMSFE Rel. to AR Model
Interest Rates
IS-3M 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.97 1.07 0.99 1.00 0.98
DIL-10 0.81 ∗∗ 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.60 ∗∗ 1.03 0.97 0.96
Interest Rates Spreads
SPR-10Y-3M 0.91 ∗ 0.99 1.02 1.03 0.71 ∗∗ 0.90 0.93 0.88
SPR-C-G 0.86 0.99 0.86 0.75 1.12 0.92 ∗ 1.00 0.91
SPR-B-G 0.76 1.01 0.92 0.74 0.94 1.51 1.03 0.79
SPR-BF-G 1.39 2.14 2.95 1.02 2.39 2.33 2.93 1.20
Monetary Aggregates
DLNM1 1.17 1.00 0.92 0.98 1.39 0.93 0.95 0.85
DLNM1R 1.16 0.93 0.90 0.89 1.45 0.88 0.91 0.85
DLNM2 1.06 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.05 0.91 0.99 0.94
DLNM2R 1.05 1.03 1.07 1.05 0.69 ∗ 1.15 1.00 1.03
DLNM3 0.99 1.01 1.02 1.04 0.72 ∗ 0.90 0.99 0.94
DLNM3R 1.08 1.01 1.16 1.16 0.75 1.13 1.02 1.09
To be continued...
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RMSFE
GDP IP
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Root Mean Squared Forecast Error Root Mean Squared Forecast Error
AR 6.08 5.16 4.82 4.56 19.14 16.61 14.07 13.15
RMSFE Rel. to AR Model RMSFE Rel. to AR Model
Other Financial Indicators
DLNDAX 0.78 ∗ 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.69 ∗∗∗ 0.92 ∗ 0.85 0.87
VOLA1 0.96 0.90 0.95 0.93 1.26 0.81 0.96 0.95
DLNEX 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.01 0.90 1.11 1.05 1.03
DLNEXR 1.07 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.30 1.12 1.04 1.03
DLNHWWI 1.02 1.14 1.09 1.10 0.58 0.95 1.00 1.02
DLNHWWIEX 1.02 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.51 0.96 0.97 1.01
DLNOIL 1.22 1.04 1.10 1.04 0.98 1.06 1.05 1.05
Survey Indicators
IFO-C 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.90 0.68 0.69 0.76
IFO-EXP 0.62 0.75 0.73 0.79 0.65 ∗ 0.70 ∗ 0.72 0.78
IFOM-C 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.92 0.62 ∗ 0.69 0.79 0.84
IFOM-EXP 0.64 ∗∗ 0.72 0.78 0.98 0.61 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗ 0.77 0.79
IFO-WC 0.70 0.78 0.86 0.84 0.82 ∗ 0.83 ∗ 0.84 0.86
IFO-WEXP 0.96 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.94 0.93
ZEW-EXP 0.75 0.81 0.75 0.90 1.09 0.80 0.94 0.87
ESI 0.74 0.90 0.84 0.96 1.08 0.78 ∗ 0.79 0.83
ESI-INDU 0.81 0.81 0.86 0.90 0.68 ∗ 0.75 0.85 0.95
ECCS99 0.76 0.88 0.98 1.03 1.04 0.78 ∗ 0.89 0.92
PMI 0.82 0.85 0.86 1.02 0.47 ∗∗∗ 0.90 0.91 0.99
COM 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.93 1.20 0.77 0.98 0.93
Real Economic Indicators
DLNIP-VORL 1.22 1.30 0.95 0.97 1.09 0.89 1.00 1.01
DLNORD 0.80 1.31 1.09 0.94 0.72 ∗ 1.39 1.05 0.84
DLNORD-C 1.16 0.99 0.98 0.96 1.15 0.91 1.11 0.96
DLNORD-I 0.74 ∗ 1.01 0.99 0.88 0.82 1.42 1.25 0.80
CAPA 0.79 1.06 0.95 0.94 0.74 0.81 0.90 0.86
DLNEW 0.95 0.98 1.07 1.05 0.89 0.96 1.05 1.05
DALQ 0.99 1.03 1.08 1.09 1.22 0.98 1.07 1.03
DLNVAC 0.88 0.94 0.98 0.89 1.11 1.13 1.00 0.97
DLNWHOUR 0.95 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.99 1.00
DLNCPI 1.26 1.02 0.97 0.98 1.49 0.98 0.97 0.96
DLNCPI-EX 1.17 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.75 0.93 1.07 1.02
Note: The entry in the ﬁrst line is the RMSFE for the AR model forecast, in percentage
growth rates at an annual rate. The remaining entries are the relative RMSFE of the forecast
based on the individual indicator, relative to the RMSFE of the benchmark AR forecast. The
forecast period is 2007q1 to 2009q4. The abbreviation of leading indicators are outlined in
Table 5. ∗∗∗: 1%, ∗∗: 5% and ∗: 10% indicating the signiﬁcance level of the modiﬁed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for h = 1 and h = 2 as proposed by Diebold/Mariano (1995).
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4 Forecast Combination
Since the seminal work by Bates/Granger (1969), the literature on forecast pooling
has conclusively shown that the forecasting performance of forecast combination is
much more stable than that of single indicator models.11 In general, it has been
shown that even very simple combination schemes do well in terms of forecasting.
The pooling of individual indicators via combination schemes oﬀers the possibility to
take into account various sources of information. Due to estimation uncertainty the
aggregation of information in one model is practically challenging. To circumvent
this problem the literature has proposed techniques such as dynamic factor models
and shrinkage methods. The attractive feature of forecast combination methods
is their simplicity and the fact that their performance can still be attributed to
their constitute models (which is helpful in the interpretation of the results). In
this paper we consider three simple forecast combination schemes to analyze their
performance for GDP as well as IP during the economic crisis 2007-2009.12 We
therefore diﬀerentiate two strategies. First, we only use the linear models as is done
in most of the literature. Second, we augment the pooling approach to include also
the non-linear models. In general, the weight ωh
i,t that is assigned to each indicator
forecast is based on the ith individual equation described by eq.(1). Accordingly, the
















i,t = 1 (4)
The ﬁrst pooling method, that is quite standard and often used as a benchmark, is
the equal weighting scheme. Simply to calculate, it is found to be hard to beat by
more complicated methods. Furthermore, this is the weighting scheme that is used
to produce the consensus forecast. Second, beside mean forecasts, where the weights
are the same for each period, we use the median forecast to take into account the
eﬀect of outliers. We also use the in-sample ﬁt to calculate individual weights. In the
literature, Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) has received much attention because it
can be an attractive way in dealing with model uncertainty. As shown by Hansen
(2008), BMA (under the assumption of diﬀuse priors) can be easily approximated by
calculating weights along the Schwarz criteria (SIC) which is also known as Bayesian
11 See, Timmermann, 2006, for literature overview; for the US (Stock/Watson, 2004), the
euro area (Drechsel/Maurin, 2010) and also for Germany before the outbreak of the crisis
(Kuzin/Marcellino/Schumacher, 2009; Drechsel/Scheufele, 2010).
12 For an overview of several pooling methods, see Drechsel/Scheufele, 2010.
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Information Criteria (BIC).13 Finally, we consider also the use of R2 as an alternative
to the SIC which also takes into account the error variance of each indicator model
(see Drechsel/Maurin, 2010).
Table 4: Relative RMSFEs of Combination Forecasts
GDP IP
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Linear Models
Equal weights 0.77 ∗∗ 0.87 ∗ 0.88 0.87 0.79 ∗∗ 0.87 0.91 0.89
Median weights 0.73 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗ 0.87 0.88 0.82 ∗∗ 0.88 ∗ 0.88 0.89
SIC weights 0.78 ∗∗ 0.88 ∗ 0.89 0.87 0.79 ∗∗ 0.88 0.92 0.89
R2 weights 0.78 ∗∗ 0.87 ∗ 0.87 0.87 0.79 ∗∗ 0.87 0.91 0.89
Linear & Non-linear Models
Equal weights 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.81 ∗∗ 0.85 0.85 0.81
Median weights 0.84 ∗∗ 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.84 ∗∗∗ 0.84 0.84 0.83
SIC weights 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.81 ∗∗ 0.87 0.86 0.81
R2 weights 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.82 ∗∗ 0.85 0.85 0.89
Note: Relative RMSFE of the forecast based on pooling of individual indicators. ∗∗∗:
1%, ∗∗: 5% and ∗: 10% signiﬁcance level of the modiﬁed Diebold-Mariano test.
The results based on forecast combination indicate that model averaging schemes
improve the forecast accuracy compared to the benchmark (see Table 4). The ﬁndings
for the weighting schemes presented are very similar, however for many of them the
diﬀerences compared to the benchmark are even statistically signiﬁcant. However,
some individual leading indicator forecasts provide more accurate results than the
combination of the bundle of forecasts. It is also interesting that the inclusion
of non-linear models into the pooling does not always lead to an improvement in
forecasting accuracy. Only for a longer forecast horizon, the inclusion of non-linear
models lead to lower forecasts errors of the combination schemes (although the
diﬀerences remain small).















t,i = SICt,i − SICt,min.
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5 Comparison between Leading Indicator
Forecasts and Professional Forecasters
Using the quarterly forecasts by the professional forecasters, we create a forecast
dataset that is comparable with the forecasts of the annualized growth rate given by
the individual leading indicators and the forecast combination. Therefore, we have
to transform year-on-year to quarterly annualized GDP growth rates.14


















Best Leading Indicator Model
Forecast Steps
Source: Consensus Economics (2009) and own calculations.
We ﬁnd that the forecasts by the professionals display good forecasting properties
and at each horizon beat the univariate benchmark (see Figure 4). Professionals do
also well compared to leading indicator models and tend to perform better than the
forecast combination schemes. The forecast errors are extremely close to those of the
best leading indicator model. This may imply that during the recession professional
forecasters processed information very fast and thus might have also used qualitative
information not explicitly considered in econometric models. It has to be kept in
mind that most forecasters of the consensus economics work for banks and other
ﬁnancial companies which might be earlier aware of the crisis compared to other
14 Which is done by using past real-time GDP series. Unfortunately, Consensus Economics does
not provide quarterly growth rates for IP with ﬁxed forecasting horizon. Thus we have to solely
rely on GDP forecasts.
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people in the economy. Overall, the mean forecast from Consensus Economics did
relatively well during the recession and keep up with the best econometric models.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the regression 2008/2009 from a forecaster’s perspective.
In a ﬁrst attempt we analyze the forecasts from Consensus Economics before and
during the recession. For Germany, we ﬁnd that before the crash of Lehman the crisis
was not predicted by the professionals. After the bankruptcy, forecasters heavily
revised their forecast for the upcoming year and even tended to overshoot.
From the investigation of leading indicators we can learn several things. Generally, we
can conﬁrm that forecasts based on leading indicators provide some warning signals
before the outbreak of the recession. In particular, survey indicators (sentiment
indicators, ifo expectations, pmi) and ﬁnancial indicators (risk spreads, stock prices)
give early warnings. In contrast to other studies, we also take into account non-linear
leading indicator models. We ﬁnd that non-linearities are only helpful for some
indicators (including ﬁnancial variables, survey expectations and for some price
variables). The partial success of ﬁnancial variables can be attributed to the origins
of the recession in the ﬁnancial sector. In particular, risk spreads (i.e. the spread
between corporate and government bond yields) which did not signal subsequent
recessions (Fritsche/Kuzin, 2005) reﬂect some of the causes of this recession.
When we compare leading indicator forecasts with those of professionals, we ﬁnd
that the professionals did relatively well. This implies that this recession was not
foreseeable with a comprehensive forecast knowledge based on experiences during
prior recessions, in particular in its exceptional magnitude.
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IS-3M 3-month-money market rate Buba
DIL-10 Long term government bond yield - 9-10 years Buba
Interest Rates Spreads
SPR10Y-3M Term spread (10y - 3-month-money market rate) Buba
SPR-C-G Corporate bond-government bonds Buba
SPR-B-G Spread corporate BBB- government bonds Buba / ML
SPR-BF-G Spread corporate ﬁnancial BBB-government bonds Buba / ML
Monetary Aggregates
DLNM1 M1 Buba
DLNM1R M1, real Buba
DLNM2 M2 Buba
DLNM2R M2, real Buba
DLNM3 M3 Buba
DLNM3R M3, real Buba
Other Financial Indicators
DLNDAX DAX share price index Boerse
VOLA DAX volatility Boerse
DLNEX Nominal eﬀective exchange rate Buba
DLNEXR Real eﬀective exchange rate Buba
DLNHWWI HWWI index of world market prices of raw mats. HWWI
DLNHWWI-EX HWWI index, excl. Energy ln HWWI
DLNOIL Oil prices (euros per barrel) ECB
Survey Indicators
IFO-C Ifo climate index ifo
IFO-EXP Ifo expectations index ifo
IFOM-C Ifo climate index, manufacturing ifo
IFOM-EXP Ifo expectations index, manufacturing ifo
IFO-WC World economic climate index ifo
IFO-WEXP World economic expectations index ifo
ZEW-EXP ZEW economic expectations ZEW
ESI Economic sentiment indicator (average) EC
ESI-INDU Industrial conﬁdence indicator EC
ECCS99 Economic conﬁdence indicator (average) EC
PMI Markit survey, PMI: manufacturing Markit
Real Economic Indicators
DLNIP-VORL Intermediate goods production Buba
DLNORD Manufacturing orders Buba
DLNORD-C Manufacturing orders – consumer goods Buba
DLNORD-I Manufacturing orders – capital goods Buba
DCAPA Capacity utilization ifo
DLNEW Employed persons (work-place concept) BfA
DALQ Unemployment rate BfA
DLNVAC Vacancies Buba
DLNWHOUR Hours worked Destatis
DLNCPI Consumer price index Buba
DLNCPI-EX Core CPI Buba
Composite Leading Indicators
COM Early Bird indicator Commerzbank
Note: The data is used in levels unless the label starts with D, indicating the use of ﬁrst diﬀerences
or DLN for logged diﬀerences. The data is published with a lag of 0 or 1 quarters. The sources are
labeled as follows: Buba - Deutsche Bundesbank, ML - Merrill Lynch, EC - European Commission,
Destatis - German Statistical Oﬃce, BfA - Bundesagentur für Arbeit.
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Table 6: Unit Root Test Results
Name t-stat lag Name t-stat lag
Key Variables Survey Indicators
DLNGDP -6.56 ∗∗∗ [0] IFO-C -4.75 ∗∗∗ [1]
DLNIP -8.41 ∗∗∗ [0] IFO-EXP -5.37 ∗∗∗ [1]
Interest rates IFOM-C -4.93 ∗∗∗ [1]
IS-3M -2.79 ∗ [1] IFOM-EXP -5.33 ∗∗∗ [1]
DIL-10 -5.99 ∗∗∗ [0] IFO-WC -4.01 ∗∗∗ [1]
Interest rates Spreads IFO-WEXP -4.17 ∗∗∗ [1]
SPR-10Y-3M -3.20 ∗∗ [1] ZEW-EXP -4.36 ∗∗∗ [1]
SPR-C-G -2.67 ∗ [1] ESI -4.55 ∗∗∗ [1]
SPR-B-G -2.93 ∗∗ [1] ESI-INDU -5.18 ∗∗∗ [1]
SPR-BF-G -3.01 ∗∗ [1] ECCS99 -3.82 ∗∗∗ [1]
Monetary Aggregates PMI -4.43 ∗∗∗ [1]
DLNM1 -5.64 ∗∗∗ [0] Real Economic Indicators
DLNM1R -5.73 ∗∗∗ [0] DLNIP-VORL -5.63 ∗∗∗ [1]
DLNM2 -5.25 ∗∗∗ [0] DLNORD -5.20 ∗∗∗ [1]
DLNM2R -5.61 ∗∗∗ [0] DLNORD-C -7.61 ∗∗∗ [0]
DLNM3 -3.79 ∗∗∗ [0] DLNORD-I -5.03 ∗∗∗ [0]
DLNM3R -4.43 ∗∗∗ [0] DCAPA -4.91 ∗∗∗ [0]
Other ﬁnancial indicators DLNEW -3.53 ∗∗∗ [0]
DLNDAX -5.35 ∗∗∗ [0] DALQ -4.65 ∗∗∗ [0]
VOLA1 -3.08 ∗∗ [0] DLNVAC -3.34 ∗∗ [0]
DLNEX -7.86 ∗∗∗ [0] DLNWHOUR -6.10 ∗∗∗ [3]
DLNEXR -6.74 ∗∗∗ [0] DLNCPI -4.96 ∗∗∗ [0]
DLNHWWI -6.67 ∗∗∗ [1] DLNCPI-EX -4.91 ∗∗∗ [0]
DLNHWWAEX -6.31 ∗∗∗ [0] Composite Leading Indicators
DLNOIL -7.02 ∗∗∗ [0] COM -4.03 ∗∗∗ [1]
Note: ADF-test results are shown. Signiﬁcance levels are deﬁned by ∗∗∗:
1%, ∗∗: 5% and ∗: 10%. Lag selection according to SIC.
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Table 7: Break Test Results for GDP Models
Name h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Interest Rates
IS-3M – – – – – – – –
DIL-10 – – – – – – – –
Interest Rates Spreads
SPR-10Y-3M ∗ 2004Q2 ∗∗∗ 2004Q1 – – – –
SPR-C-G – – – – ∗ 1994Q2 – –
SPR-B-G ∗ 2004q1 ∗∗∗ 2004q2 ∗∗∗ 2004q3 ∗∗∗ 2004q4
SPR-BF-G – – ∗∗ 2005q2 ∗∗ 2005q2 ∗∗ 2005q3
Monetary Aggregates
DLNM1 – – – – – – – –
DLNM1R – – – – – – – –
DLNM2 – – – – – – – –
DLNM2R – – – – – – – –
DLNM3 – – – – – – – –
DLNM3R – – – – – – – –
Other Financial Indicators
DLNDAX – – – – – – – –
VOLA1 – – – – – – – –
DLNEX – – – – – – – –
DLNEXR – – – – – – – –
DLNHWWI – – – – – – – –
DLNHWWIEX – – – – – – – –
DLNOIL – – – – – – – –
Survey Indicators
IFO-C – – – – – – ∗∗ 2002q4
IFO-EXP – – – – – – – –
IFOM-C – – – – – – ∗ 2002q4
IFOM-EXP – – – – – – – –
IFO-WC – – – – – – – –
IFO-WEXP – – – – – – – –
ZEW-EXP – – – – – – – –
ESI – – – – – – – –
ESI-INDU – – – – ∗ 2002q3 – –
ECCS99 – – – – – – – –
PMI – – – – ∗ 2005q3 – –
Real Economic Indicators
DLNIP-VORL – – – – – – – –
DLNORD – – – – – – – –
DLNORD-C – – – – – – – –
DLNORD-I – – – – – – – –
CAPA – – – – – – – –
DLNEW – – – – – – – –
DALQ – – – – – – – –
DLNVAC – – – – – – – –
DLNWHOUR – – – – – – – –
DLNCPI – – – – – – – –
DLNCPI-EX – – – – – – – –
Composite Leading Indicators
COM – – ∗∗∗ 2004q1 ∗∗∗ 2004q3 ∗∗∗ 2001q1
Percentage of models signiﬁcant at
10% level 4.8% 9.5% 14.3% 11.9%
5% level 0.0% 9.5% 7.1% 9.5%
Note: Results of the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test are shown along the most likely
break point. Signiﬁcance levels are deﬁned by ∗∗∗: 1%, ∗∗: 5% and ∗: 10%. All results
are based on the maximum F-Test. The trimming level is 15%.
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